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PRECURSORS OF ROSA PARKS: MARYLAND
TRANSPORTATION CASES BETWEEN THE CIVIL
WAR AND THE BEGINNING OF
WORLD WAR I
DAVID S. BOGEN*
When Rosa Parks refused to move to a seat in the back of the bus
in Montgomery, it sparked a boycott and was a critical event in the
Civil Rights movement.' But Mrs. Parks was not the first African
American to resist segregation. Mary Anderson, Aaron Bradley,
Josephine Carr, Harriet E. Cully, John W. Fields, Professor W. H.H.
Hart, Ellen Jackson, Annie A. Jakes, James Jenkins, Reverend Harvey
Johnson, Reverend Robert McGuinn, the Stewart sisters, Alexander
Thompson, and Thomas W. Turner were among the many teachers,
ministers, businessmen, and ordinary citizens who refused to accept
second class treatment on Maryland's waterways and rails.2 The Mont-
gomery boycott succeeded in part because federal courts struck down
the Alabama state law requiring segregation on the buses;3 however,
nearly a century earlier, the legal landscape for African Americans was
far less supportive.
* Professor of Law and T. Carroll Brown Scholar, University of Maryland School of
Law. B.A., LL.B., Harvard University; LL.M., New York University. I would like to thank
my colleague, Professor Larry Gibson, for organizing the reunion of African-American
alumni of the school that gave rise to these papers, for the work his students have done on
related topics, and for the materials, particularly from the Afro-American, which he gener-
ously copied for me.
1. See CATHERINE A. BARNES, JOURNEY FROM JIM CROW: THE DESEGREGATION OF SOUTH-
ERN TRANSIT 108-31 (1983) (discussing the Montgomery bus boycott and its effect on segre-
gation in transportation in other southern cities).
2. See infra notes 27-35 and accompanying text (discussing Anderson and Jackson);
infra notes 36-55 and accompanying text (discussing Bradley); infra notes 56-57 and accom-
panying text (discussing Jakes); infra notes 67-91 and accompanying text (discussing
Thompson); infra notes 94-99 and accompanying text (discussing Fields); infra notes 100-
109 and accompanying text (discussing Carr); infra notes 115-122 and accompanying text
(discussing Cully); infra notes 130-145 and accompanying text (discussing the Stewart sis-
ters and Johnson); infra notes 146-158 and accompanying text (discussing McGuinn); infra
notes 210-224 and accompanying text (discussing Hart); infra notes 246-250 and accompa-
nying text (discussing Turner); infra notes 252-259 and accompanying text (discussing
Jenkins).
3. Browder v. Gayle, 142 F. Supp. 707, 717 (M.D. Ala. 1956), affd, 352 U.S. 903
(1956). The Browder court held that the law violated both the Due Process and the Equal
Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Id.
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The Supreme Court took a limited view of the Civil War Amend-
ments.' It struck down the Civil Rights Act of 1875, which had at-
tempted to prohibit discrimination in public accommodations.5
Despite the elimination of federal statutory protection, African Ameri-
cans fought segregation in Maryland transportation by protest, boy-
cott, and litigation.6 Using federal common law in diversity suits and
admiralty, they initially had federal court support, and their resistance
to segregation helped keep transportation in Maryland largely inte-
grated through the end of the nineteenth century.7
The very victories that compelled private companies to provide
equal facilities were turned against the victors when the Supreme
Court later cited them as a basis to uphold the Louisiana segregation
ordinance in Plessy v. Ferguson.8 After Plessy, Maryland began to man-
date segregation in transportation.9 African Americans fought back
in every way imaginable, but the courts upheld state mandated segre-
gation of intrastate transit, and interstate transportation companies
maintained segregation to make it easier to comply with the state law
for segregation of intrastate passengers.° When the Court of Appeals
of Maryland upheld the state statutes,1 1 the only recourse left was to
fight for physical equality in treatment. State and federal courts and
agencies were not very sympathetic to claims of discrimination in the
beginning of the twentieth century, however, allowing companies to
4. See, e.g., United States v. Cruikshank, 42 U.S. 542, 543 (1876) (holding that the
Fourteenth Amendment does not prevent encroachment of individual rights by private
citizens); Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 58-59 (1873) (holding that the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of Fourteenth Amendment did not apply to fundamental rights).
5. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 25-26 (1883).
6. See, e.g., Protest Against 7im Crow" Cars, AFRO-AM. LEDGER (Bait.), Feb. 22, 1902, at 4
(discussing opposition to the passage of Maryland's "Separate Car Bill"); James Crow Enters
Maryland and Creates Disturbances and Gets Into Court, AFRo-AM. LEDGER (Balt.), July 16, 1904,
at 4 (discussing a boycott of railroads and steamships, and early legal challenges to the
"Separate Car Law").
7. See, e.g., infra notes 63-91 and accompanying text (discussing one attack against
segregation under the federal law of common carriers).
8. 163 U.S. 537, 548 (1896) (citing The Sue, 22 F. 843 (D. Md. 1885)); see infra text
accompanying notes 180-192.
9. See, e.g., 1904 Md. Laws, ch. 109 (requiring railroads to provide separate cars for
black and white passengers).
10. See, e.g., Two Baltimoreans File Suit Against W.B. & A. Railroad, AFRO-Am. LEDGER
(Bait.), Feb. 14, 1919, at 2 (noting railroad policy of segregating interstate passengers and
two early legal challenges).
11. Hart v. State, 100 Md. 595, 615, 60 A. 457, 463 (1905) (finding statutes mandating
segregation valid as applied to intrastate passengers but unconstitutional as applied to in-
terstate travelers). Id.; see also State v. Jenkins, 124 Md. 376, 92 A. 773 (1905) (upholding
the 1908 segregation statute).
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escape the apparent requirements of equality in the law by making
promises of improvement. 12
At first, white lawyers represented the men and women who re-
sisted racial discrimination. 13 With the admission of the first African-
American attorney to the Maryland bar in 1885,14 leadership passed to
African-American attorneys. As segregation tightened its grip around
the nation, men like Warner T. McGuinn and W. Ashbie Hawkins (for
all African-American attorneys in Maryland prior to World War II were
men) fought valiantly for equality.15 They created the tradition of le-
gal struggle for equal rights in Maryland from which Thurgood Mar-
shall emerged to provide the leadership that ultimately defeated
segregation. 16
I. CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1866
Prior to the Civil War, segregation in transportation was primarily
a Northern phenomenon, which was on the decline.17 In the South,
slaves rode with their masters so as to be available to provide ser-
vices,18 while laws to prevent escapes discouraged solo travel by blacks
of any status.' 9 If transportation facilities did not exclude free blacks,
12. See, e.g., Officers Admit Color Discrimination, AFRo-AM. LEDGER (Bat.), Dec. 9, 1911, at
1 (reporting on a complaint filed with the Public Service Commission by W. Ashbie Haw-
kins for poor accommodations for blacks on a steamship, and noting that the railroad's
attorney admitted discrimination and promised to take whatever action the Commission
ordered). Hawkins' complaint was dismissed by the Public Service Commission, although
the Commission recommended that the railroad improve the accommodations it provided
African Americans. Hawkins v. Bait., Chesapeake & At. Ry., 3 Md. Pub. Serv. Comm. Rpts.
49, 52 (1912).
13. See, e.g., Right of Colored People to Travel on the Passenger Cars, BALT. WEEKLY SUN, July
14, 1866, at 2 (reporting that Archibald Stirling, Jr. acted as counsel for Annie A. Jakes
when she challenged segregation on Baltimore's street cars).
14. Everett Waring was admitted to the Supreme Bench of Baltimore on October 10,
1885. David S. Bogen, The Transformation of the Fourteenth Amendment: Reflections from the
Admission of Maryland's First Black Attorneys, 44 MD. L. REv. 939-1046 (1986).
15. See, e.g., Protest Against "im Crow" Cars, supra note 6, at 4 (reporting on the delega-
tion opposed to the "Separate Car Bill," which was led by McGuinn, Hawkins, and others).
16. SeeJ. CLAY SMITH,JR., EMANCIPATION: THE MAKING OF THE BLACK LAWYER, 1844-1944,
at 146-47 (1993) (describing McGuinn and Hawkins as pioneers); JUAN WILLIAMS,
THURGOOD MARSHALL: AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY 61-62 (1998) (describing McGuinn as a
mentor to Marshall).
17. See BARNES, supra note 1, at 2 (noting that segregation in transportation first flour-
ished in the North before the Civil War, but had been successfully challenged by litigation,
boycotts, and legislative advocacy by 1865); LEON F. LITWACK, NORTH OF SLAVERY: THE NE-
GRO IN THE FREE STATES, 1790-1860, at 97-100, 106-12 (1961) (discussing segregation and
racial prejudice in the North prior to the Civil War and efforts to combat it).
18. VERNON LANE WHARTON, THE NEGRO IN MISSISSIPPI 1865-1890, at 230 (1947).
19. RICHARD C. WADE, SLAVERY IN THE CITIES: THE SOUTH 1820-1860, at 266-67 (1964).
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they were likely to segregate the few who traveled.2° Slavery's aboli-
tion was swiftly accompanied by the rise of broader segregation.21
The enactment of the Civil Rights Act on April 9, 1866, spurred
African-American resistance.22 The Act provided that citizens of every
race and color were entitled to the same right to make and enforce
contracts as was enjoyed by white citizens.23 This created a plausible
argument that discrimination in offering contracts for public accom-
modations violated the federal statute.24 However, there were strong
counterarguments that the Act applied only to government action,
that the "right to contract" referred only to agreements between will-
ing parties, and that basic rights protected by the statute did not ex-
tend to access to public accommodations. 2' Early attempts in
20. Id.; see also HOwARD N. RABINOWITZ, RACE RELATIONS IN THE URBAN SOUTH 1865-
1890, at 182 (1978) (noting segregation on railroads and steamships and, in New Orleans,
the use of separate streetcars for blacks and whites instead of the exclusion of blacks
altogether).
21. RABINOWITZ, supra note 20, at 182-84; BARNES, supra note 1, at 2-3 (discussing the
rise of systematic segregation in transportation in the South after the Civil War).
22. Baltimore, BALTIMORE GAZETTE, Apr. 18, 1866, at 1; see, e.g., Colored Persons Claiming
Equal Rights of Railroad Travel, etc., BALT. SUN, May 17, 1866, at 1 (reporting on a case
brought by Mary J.C. Anderson and Ellen G. Jackson under the Civil Rights Act of 1866
where they were ejected from a ladies' waiting room at a train station); Richard Paul Fuke,
Black Marylanders 1864-66 (1973) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Chicago).
23. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (1866).
24. The U.S. District Court in Mobile, Alabama applied the Act to railway discrimina-
tion and held that riding on a privately owned city railroad car was a private right protected
by the federal law. ROBERTJ. KACZOROWSKI, THE POLITICS OFJUDICIAL INTERPRETATION: THE
FEDERAL COURTS, DEPARTMENT OFJUSTICE AND CIVIL RiGHTS, 1866-1876, at 8 (1985). The
Iowa Supreme Court held several years later that the Act applied to discrimination in trans-
portation. Coger v. North West Union Packet Co., 37 Iowa 145, 160 (1873) (holding that
black passengers of Steamship held equal rights as white passengers). However, the Act
was not widely interpreted and used in this way. KACZOROWSKI, supra, at 8 (noting that
judges were not in general agreement that the Act extended to public accommodations);
EARL M. MALTZ, CIVIL RIGHTS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND CONGRESS, 1863-1869, at 70-72
(1990) (noting the debate on whether the Act extended to public accommodations and
discussing the arguments for and against).
25. There was substantial contemporary understanding that the Act only applied to
governmental discrimination and not private acts. See MALTZ, supra note 24, at 75-78. The
Supreme Court did not hold that the Act applies to private acts of discrimination until
1968. Jones v. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 413 (1968) (sale or rental of real estate). Further,
given the northern origins of segregation in transportation, it was difficult to argue that it
was a "badge of slavery" that might be within the ambit of the 1866 Act. The enactment of
the Civil Rights Act of 1875 prohibiting discrimination in transportation also indicated that
the Civil Rights Act of 1866 did not effectively prohibit such discrimination. See Joseph
William Singer, No Right to Exclude: Public Accommodations and Private Prperty, 90 Nw. U. L.
REv. 1283, 1427-28 (1996) (noting the argument that the Act of 1866 was not intended to
extend to public accommodations).
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Maryland to vindicate rights to public accommodations through the
statute were fruitless.26
Mary J.C. Anderson and Ellen G. Jackson, black Maryland school
teachers from counties north of Baltimore, tested train depot segrega-
tion. They filed a complaint seeking the arrest of a station master who
tossed them out of the ladies' waiting room.27 This was intended as a
test case because the teachers acted with "legal advice backed byjudi-
cial opinion."28 They may have chosen to proceed in state court be-
cause of doubt whether the federal court had jurisdiction.29 Section
three of the Civil Rights Act provided jurisdiction of "all causes, civil
and criminal, affecting persons who are denied or cannot enforce in
the courts ... of the State ... the rights secured to them by the first
section of this act."3° They may have feared that federal courts would
not take jurisdiction under the Civil Rights Act unless the state courts
refused to enforce the provisions of section one of the Act.31 Prosecu-
tion for assault in state court would not raise ajurisdictional problem,
and they apparently believed that the 1866 Civil Rights Act eliminated
26. See infra notes 27-35 (discussing one such unsuccessful attempt to employ the Civil
Rights Act of 1866 to combat discrimination in access to public accommodations).
27. Colored Persons Claiming Equal Rights of Railroad Travel, etc., supra note 22, at 1.
28. Another Civil Rights Case-Railroad Privileges to Colored Persons, AM. COMMERCIAL AD-
VERTISER, May 16, 1866, at 4. Section 2, the criminal enforcement portion of the Civil
Rights Act of 1866, required the defendant to be acting under color of law, which would
have been difficult to show. Ch. 31, § 2, 14 Stat. 27. That may be part of the reason why
Anderson and Jackson chose to proceed in state court.
29. See MALTZ, supra note 24, at 73-74 (noting the arguments for and against expansive
jurisdiction under the Act and the resulting confusion over whether the Act granted juris-
diction to the federal courts only in cases where state courts refused to enforce its
provisions).
30. Ch. 31, § 3, 14 Stat. 27. There was some question whether a criminal prosecution
of the perpetrator of assault was "a cause affecting" the person whose rights were denied
(the victim), and thus whether the federal courts had jurisdiction over such cases. KACZOR-
owsVi, supra note 24, at 11. The Supreme Court ultimately held that federal courts did not
have jurisdiction over such cases. Blyew v. United States, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 581, 595
(1872). Further, in Jackson and Anderson's case, the state was willing to arrest the station
master or conductor for assault, and a federal court might not have found that a jury
verdict of not guilty denied the victim's rights. See DONALD G. NIEMAN, To SET THE LAW IN
MOTION: THE FREEDMEN'S BUREAU AND THE LEGAL RiGHTS OF BLAcKs 1865-1868, at 114
(1979) (noting the reluctance of federal judges to proceed against state officials who at
least nominally investigated crimes against blacks, even though those officials failed to
bring about justice).
31. MALTZ, supra note 24, at 74 (noting contemporary understanding that federal
courts possessed "quasi-appellate" jurisdiction in cases where state courts refused to en-
force section one of the Act). "[The Freedman's] Bureau officials also found that Con-
gress's civil rights act, narrow in conception and indifferently administered by officials of
the Johnson administration, did not, save in a few instances, allow them to have cases
involving freedmen tried outside of state courts." NIEMAN, supra note 30, at 148.
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any defense based on enforcement of railway company policy.32 The
case was scheduled to come before Judge Hugh Lennox Bond of the
Baltimore Criminal Court, the state judge most sympathetic to civil
rights.3 3 The station master requested a jury, however, and the case
was not further mentioned in the papers.34 Maryland's all white juries
would have been unlikely to convict.35
Aaron Bradley spearheaded the next attack on segregation.36
Bradley, along with Mary G. Hutt and James H. Davis, filed a petition
in federal court for an injunction against the Baltimore City Passenger
Railway Company to prevent it from operating. 7 By requesting equi-
table relief, Bradley hoped to avoid ajury, which thwarted the chances
of success in state criminal proceedings.38 The Baltimore City Passen-
ger Railway was the largest of the various horsecar lines that furnished
the city with local transportation. 9 Under company policy, blacks
were required to stand on an uncovered platform outside the covered
portion of the horse-drawn railway car.40 Bradley and the others
32. See Another Civil Rights Case-Railroad Privileges to Colored Persons, supra note 28, at 4
(noting that the suit was intended as a test case and that the railroad would "assume the act
of the officer as its own," as it was carried out pursuant to company policy).
33. Colored Persons Claiming Equal Rights of Railroad Travel, etc., supra note 22, at 1. On
Judge Bond, see KACZOROWSKI, supra note 24, at 68 (noting that Judge Bond was opposed
to slavery and supported equal rights).
34. Proceedings of the Courts, BALT. SUN, May 21, 1866, at 1; BALT. GAZETTE, May 21, 1866,
at 2.
35. Maryland did not ratify either the Fourteenth or the Fifteenth Amendment. BAR-
BARAJEANNE FIELDS, SLAVERY AND FREEDOM ON THE MIDDLE GROUND: MARYLAND DURING THE
NINETEENTH CENTURY 133-34 (1985). The legislature even removed jurisdiction in appren-
ticeship cases from Judge Bond, the only judge in the state likely to issue writs of habeas
corpus on behalf of freedmen. Id. at 139, 151. Maryland law barred blacks from serving on
juries until 1880, when the Supreme Court declared a similar West Virginia law unconstitu-
tional in Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 304 (1879). See Michael J. Klarman, The
Plessy Era, 1998 SuP. CT. REV. 303, 371; see also Albert W. Alschuler & Andrew G. Deiss, A
Brief History of the Criminal Jury in the United States, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 867, 889-90 (1994)
(discussing discrimination by white jurors against black litigants in the years following the
Civil War).
36. Civil Rights-Action Against the City Passenger Railway Company, BALT. SUN, May 24,
1866, at 4.
37. Id. Specifically, they sought to prevent the railway from running past the Douglass
Institute on Lexington Street, near where the plaintiffs lived and where the rail company
refused to accept black passengers. Id.
38. The Seventh Amendment does not preserve the right to ajury trial where a court is
exercising its equity jurisdiction. See Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 447 (1830)
(noting that the Seventh Amendment was intended to "embrace all suits which are not of
equity and admiralty jurisdiction").
39. SHERRY H. OLSON, BALTIMORE: THE BUILDING OF AN AMERICAN CITY 161 (1980).
40. See Baltimore City Passenger Railway, Who Shall Ride in the Cars, Suit in the United States
Court, BALT. AM. & COMMERCIAL ADVERTISER, Apr. 30, 1870, at I (reporting on the case of
Alexander Thompson, who was ejected from a seat in the covered portion of a car and
forced onto the uncovered platform).
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claimed that this policy violated the railway's terms of operation, as
laid out in its charter.41
U.S. District Court Judge William Fell Giles, noting that some
complainants were Baltimore residents, stated that the jurisdiction of
the federal court applied only to suits between citizens of different
states.42 Judge Giles may have been referring to the petition's claim of
rights under Article IV of the Constitution because such rights were
only available to citizens of other states.43 More likely, he thought the
jurisdictional provisions of the Civil Rights Act required a showing
that relief was unavailable in state courts.4 4 Without a specific grant of
jurisdiction, there were only two grounds for federal jurisdiction-ad-
miralty for maritime discrimination and diversity when the plaintiff
was from another state.45 The petitioners withdrew the petition-
leaving the impression that citizens could not successfully sue in the
federal court of their own state.46
Bradley immediately filed an amended petition as the sole plain-
tiff to enjoin the trolley car from going past his schoolroom and office
in the Douglass Institute,47 claiming diversity of citizenship as a citizen
of Massachusetts.48 The newspapers reported that Bradley claimed to
be admitted to the Massachusetts bar, but he appeared in his capacity
as plaintiff.49 Bradley contended that the street car company refused
41. Civil Rights, BALT. SUN, May 23, 1866, at 1.
42. Civil Rights-Action Against the City Passenger Railway Company, supra note 36, at 4.
43. See CivilRights Case, AM. & COMMERCIAL ADVERTISER, May 25, 1866, at 4 (noting that
Bradley alleged a violation of Article IV, § 2 Privileges and Immunities Clause). Article IV,
section 2 of the U.S. Constitution provides that "[t]he Citizens of each State shall be enti-
tled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States." U.S. CONST. art. IV,
§ 2. Some of the drafters of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment believed that the article imposed a duty on the states to grant everyone fundamental
rights, including their own citizens. DAVID SKILLEN BOGEN, PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES: A
REFERENCE GUIDE TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 44-46 (2003). Nevertheless, the
Supreme Court held that the clause only entitled citizens of other states to be treated as if
they were citizens of the state-preventing discrimination based on state of citizenship but
not conferring any other rights. Id. at 69-70; Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 180
(1868).
44. See Civil Rights, supra note 41, at 1 (noting that Judge Giles held that the Criminal
Court of Baltimore was the proper court in which to bring the action).
45. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (stating that "[t]hejudicial Power shall extend .. . to all
Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction; ... to Controversies ... between Citizens of
different States .... ").
46. Civil Rights-Action Against the City Passenger Railway Company, supra note 36, at 4.
47. The Douglass Institute was formed by three African-American partners who con-
verted a three-story brick building into a hall for meetings and public entertainment.
W.E.B. Du Bols, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION IN AMERICA 1860-1880, at 566 (1935).
48. Civil Rights Case, supra note 43, at 4.
49. Civil Rights, supra note 36 at 1. Aaron Alpeoria Bradley was admitted to the Massa-
chusetts bar in 1856; he was the third black lawyer to be admitted to that bar. SMITH, supra
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to let him ride in violation of his privileges and immunities under
Article IV, took private property without compensation, and main-
tained a common nuisance in violation of privileges granted from the
government for use of its highways without regard to color or race. 50
Judge Giles ruled that injunctive relief was not appropriate and dis-
missed the petition, stating that the proper remedy was damages in a
case at law before ajury. t Giles said that he would hear argument on
the proper construction of the Constitution and the civil rights bill if
the suit were brought as an action at law for damages, but Bradley
indicated that he would pursue the matter no further.52
The afternoon of the day he filed his petition against the city pas-
senger railway in federal court, Bradley also filed suit in state court
against the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company for ejecting him
from a railroad car on a trip from Washington to Baltimore "in con-
tempt of a law of the United States on account of his color, race,
note 16, at 100. A reconstruction military commission in Georgia convicted him of sedi-
tion in 1865 for stating that it was not a crime for freed slaves to seize the property of their
former masters, and he was sentenced to a year of hard labor at Fort Pulaski. Id. at 192-93.
Savannah papers reported that he was released in January of 1867. Id. at 193. He was
elected to the Georgia Constitutional Convention in 1867 where he was the most militant
delegate demanding black rights, calling, among other things, for an end to discrimination
on public carriers. EDwARD L. DRAGO, BLACK POLITICIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION GEOR-
CIA 41-43 (1982). After Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton ordered Bradley's release in
1867, his application for admission to the Georgia bar was rejected. Nonetheless, in 1868,
Bradley was elected to the Georgia state senate. Id. at 193. The timing suggests that the
Maryland plaintiff assumed Bradley's identity, but the description of a "dignified colored
Boston lawyer," Civil Rights, supra note 41, at 1, sounds like Bradley, and the confronta-
tional assertion of rights fits his character. See SMITH, supra note 16, at 193 (describing
Bradley as "uncompromising"). Perhaps he was allowed to leave Georgia during 1866 in-
stead of being confined there, or maybe he did not begin serving his term until the middle
of the year. The true explanation is elusive.
50. Civil Rights Case, supra note 43, at 4.
51. The Civil Rights Case in the United States District Court, AM. & COMMERCIAL ADVERTISER,
May 26, 1866, at 4.
52. Id. The first report in the Sun suggested that Giles told Bradley that the federal
court had no jurisdiction and the proper tribunal for assault was the Criminal Court of
Baltimore. Civil Rights, supra note 41, at 1. One report in the American & CommercialAdver-
tiser, meanwhile, said Giles' dismissal on the jurisdictional issue indicated that the federal
court had no jurisdiction over the streets of the city. Application for an Injunction-Another
Phase in the Civil Rights Bill, AM. & COMMERCIAL ADVERTISER, May 23, 1866, at 4. The peti-
tion as reported in that newspaper on May 25 had references to nuisance and assault. Civil
Rights Case, supra note 43, at 4. Giles may have remarked that both of those issues are
matters of state law. See The Civil Rights Case in the United States District Court, supra note 51,
at 4 (noting that Judge Giles held that Bradley had not presented a case for equitable
relief, and that the proper remedy would be an action at law). The Douglass Institute
directors repudiated the suit, which sought to enjoin the trains from passing the institute.
Civil Rights Case, supra note 43, at 4 (reporting that the directors placed an advertisement
in The American to state that Bradley's suit was brought without their knowledge or
consent).
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&c."" This time he sought damages, so the suit avoided the discre-
tion inherent in requests for equity. 4 But Judge Hayward held that
Bradley had no cause of action.
5
The following month, Mrs. Annie A. Jakes, the wife of a "well-
known colored barber and waiter," charged a conductor of the Balti-
more City Passenger Railway with assault for ejecting her from a rail-
way car. 56 Unionist leader Archibald Stirling, Jr. appeared as her
counsel, but the defendant demanded a jury trial in state court and
the case was not further reported. 7
Thus, within a few months of the enactment of the Civil Rights
Act of 1866, litigants understood that most of the doors had been
shut. The federal court seemed to think that actions for assault were
for the state to deal with,58 but state juries would never convict anyone
criminally for enforcing company segregation policies.59 The federal
courts said that diversity of citizenship was necessary to get into fed-
eral court, and that actions under the Civil Rights Act of 1866 were at
best debatable, while state courts seemed to think racial discrimina-
tion by private companies was appropriate.6"
The Fourteenth Amendment was ratified in 1868 and was under-
stood to make the Civil Rights Act into a constitutional requirement.61
53. Civil Rights-Before Justice Hayward, BALT. SUN, May 23, 1866, at 1. John H.B. La-
trobe appeared for the railroad and argued that under state law the B & 0 had the author-
ity to make rules for travel. Id. He noted that white men had never objected to being
excluded from cars for ladies. Id. Perhaps because Latrobe's argument for railway discre-
tion referred to gender discrimination, the American & Commercial Advertiser thought Hay-
ward rejected the suit because Bradley was trying to get into the ladies' car. Application for
an Injunction-Another Phase in the Civil Rights Bill, supra note 52, at 4. African Americans
were generally confined to second class or smoking cars. RABINOWiTZ, supra note 20, at
191. There were sometimes separate cars for ladies and the men who accompanied them.
See Stephen J. Riegel, The Persistent Career of Jim Crow: Lower Federal Courts and the "Separate
but Equal"Doctrine, 1865-1896, 28 AM.J. LEGAL HIsT. 17, 25 (1984) (discussing a case where
a black man was removed from a car designated for ladies and those traveling with them).
Often, the non-smoking white male would occupy such cars as well. Thus, the first class car
often was referred to as the "ladies' car." JOEL WILLIAMSON, AFTER SLAVERY. THE NEGRO IN
SOUTH CAROLINA DURING RECONSTRUCTION, 1861-1877, at 284 (1965).
54. Civil Rights-Before Justice Hayward, supra note 53, at 1.
55. Id.
56. Right of Colored People to Travel on the Passenger Cars, supra note 13, at 2.
57. Id.
58. See Civil Rights, supra note 41, at 1.
59. See Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 35, at 889-90 (noting discrimination by white ju-
rors against black litigants in the years after the Civil War).
60. See supra notes 36-55 and accompanying text (discussing federal and state cases
brought by Aaron Bradley).
61. KAczOROWSi, supra note 24, at 13 (recognizing that judges understood the Four-
teenth Amendment to be identical to the Civil Rights Act of 1866 in its purpose, meaning,
and scope).
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The Amendment, however, did not directly affect segregation by
transportation companies, because they were private stock companies
and the Amendment only prohibited state governments from denying
equal protection.6 2
II. FEDERAL COMMON LAW IN ADMIRALTY AND DIVERSITY
JURISDICTION CASES
With the reluctance of the courts to apply the Civil Rights Act to
alter the racially discriminatory practices of a private carrier, the most
attractive remaining basis for any suit was the common law principle
that common carriers must accept all passengers who paid the fare
and did not misbehave.63 Unfortunately, the law of common carriers
did not require the carrier to provide the seat of the passenger's
choice as long as the carrier furnished appropriate accommoda-
tions.64 Common carrier suits nonetheless attacked the carriers' fail-
ure to provide passengers with the class of accommodations for which
they were willing to pay.6 5 By making the cost of segregation high
enough, this tactic could drive carriers to integrate.66
On October 30, 1869, Alexander Thompson, an African-Ameri-
can citizen from New York claiming diversity of citizenship, filed suit
in federal district court to recover damages against the railway for
ejection from a rail car.6 7 Archibald Stirling, Jr., newly appointed U.S.
Attorney for Maryland, and George C. Maund, were his counsel
before Judge Giles.68  The railway company demurred to the
complaint.6"
The railway company's lawyer, Arthur W. Machen, offered two ba-
sic arguments at the April 1870 term of the court. First, Machen
62. See MALrz, supra note 24, at 102-06 (discussing the state action limitation).
63. Riegel, supra note 53, at 31.
64. Id. (noting that the law also allowed carriers to make regulations for safety and
comfort and that racial segregation was considered just a reasonable regulation); West
Chester & Phila. R.R. Co. v. Miles, 55 Pa. 209 (1867) (holding that a black woman removed
from a train for refusing to move to a seat in the section designated for black passengers
could not recover where the seat she was requested to move to was adequate in terms of
safety and comfort).
65. See Riegel, supra note 53, at 30-31 (citing McGuinn v. Forbes, 37 F. 639, 641 (D. Md.
1889)); Houck v. S. Pac. Ry. Co., 38 F. 226, 228 (C.C.W.D. Tex. 1888); The Sue, 22 F. 843,
844 (D. Md. 1885); Gray v. Cincinnati S. R.R. Co., 111 F. 683, 685-86 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1882).
66. See The Sue, 22 F. at 848 (holding that if it is too costly for carriers to provide equal
accommodations, they have no duty to separate black and white passengers).
67. Baltimore City Passenger Railway, Who Shall Ride in the Cars? Suit in the United States
Court, supra note 40, at 1.
68. Baltimore City Passenger Railway: Who Shall Ride in the Cars? Test Case in United States
Circuit Court, BALT. Am. & COMMERCIAL ADVERTISER, Apr. 30, 1870, at 1.
69. Id.
730 [VOL. 63:721
2004] PRECURSORS OF ROSA PARKS: TRANSPORTATION CASES 731
claimed that railways were free to choose whom they would carry and
under what conditions because the railway charter did not expressly
limit the exercise of such property rights y.7 " At the least, railroads
could make any reasonable decision to separate the races.7' Before
the War, the Michigan Supreme Court had held that steamships could
reserve all the cabins for whites and force African Americans to travel
on deck. 72 The Baltimore Criminal Court's decision in Bradley's suit
against the B & 0 seemed to approve racial separation on railroads.73
In addition, a Pennsylvania lower court had upheld as a reasonable
measure a trolley rule like that of the trolley in Baltimore, which ex-
cluded blacks from the inside of the car.74 Machen cited The West
Chester and Philadelphia Railroad Company v. Miles,75 where the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania reversed a judgment for a woman who had
been forced to move to a seat reserved for colored passengers. 76 The
Pennsylvania court held that separation of the races was a reasonable
use of the railroad's property rights over its facilities, and that the trial
court should rule that if the seat was not inferior to the one she was
asked to leave, the plaintiff could not recover. 77 The references to
property rights helped Machen's argument, but the requirement that
the seat not be inferior posed an obstacle to his client's position.78
Well-established common law principles required common carriers to
take all passengers, 79 and a federal court applying federal common
70. Who Shall Ride in the Cars? Suit in the United States Court, supra note 40, at 1.
71. Id.
72. Day v. Owen, 5 Mich. 520, 526-27 (1858) (holding that a common carrier steam-
ship must accept passengers, but that it was a reasonable regulation to require blacks to
take inferior accommodations on deck and exclude them from cabins).
73. See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text (discussing the court's ruling that
Bradley had no cause of action in his suit against B & 0).
74. Goines v. M'Candless, 4 Phila. R. 255, 255, 257-58 (1861) (giving discretion to the
railroad to make "rules for the comfort and convenience" of the passengers).
75. 55 Pa. 209 (1867).
76. Id. at 215.
77. Id. at 211-12, 215. The incident arose before the enactment of a state law prohibit-
ing racial discrimination in transport, and the Pennsylvania court pointed to the law as
evidence that separation had been permissible prior to its enactment. Id. at 215.
78. Who Shall Ride in the Cars? Suit in the United States Court, supra note 40, at 1 (stating
that Thompson was ejected from a seat and compelled to stand on the platform).
79. See, e.g., Jencks v. Coleman, 13 F. Cas. 442, 443-44 (C.C.D. R.I. 1834) (No. 7, 258)
(holding that steamboats are common carriers required to take passengers unless there is a
reasonable basis for refusal); Pearson v. Duane, 71 U.S. 605, 615 (1866) (holding that
common carriers are obliged to carry all passengers who apply unless there is sufficient
excuse for refusal).
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law in diversity jurisdiction after the Civil War was unlikely to concede
the railroad more power than had the Pennsylvania common law.8 °
The company's second argument was that when the railway was
chartered in 1859, African Americans were not citizens according to
the Dred Scott decision.8" At that time, custom and usage would have
considered integrated transportation a nuisance.82 Under the law in
1859, the railway had no obligation to carry blacks and in fact was
encouraged to discriminate.83 Machen argued that the Railway Com-
pany could continue to discriminate because its charter had not
changed since 1859.84 He concluded that if there was no right of ac-
tion at common law when the railway was chartered, there could be
none a decade later.8 5
After hearing this argument, Judge Giles told plaintiff's counsel
that they need not even argue the case.86 He denied the demurrer,
noting that the situation was very different than when the trolley com-
pany began operating.87 At that time, slaves had no rights, and be-
cause color was presumptive evidence of slavery, carriers had stringent
rules to prevent slave escapes.88 With the end of slavery, the reason
for such rules had disappeared, and the Fourteenth Amendment as-
sured citizenship for African Americans. 89 Thus, the common carrier
could no longer refuse to accept African Americans who sought pas-
sage.9" Judge Giles ruled that although separate seating would be per-
missible, there was no justification for a common carrier to treat
passengers who paid the same fare to inferior seating.91
The Baltimore City Passenger Railway responded immediately by
providing separate cars for African Americans to sit inside-limiting
blacks to those cars marked with a sign permitting colored passen-
80. Before the landmark case of Erie v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), the Supreme
Court held that federal courts should apply "general" law, irrespective of local laws, when
ruling on cases where jurisdiction was based in diversity. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1,
23 (1842).
81. Baltimore City Passengers Railway: Who Shall Ride in the Cars? Test Case in United States
Circuit Court, supra note 68, at 1.
82. Id. (noting that under the law in 1859, integrated cars "would have been declared a
nuisance").
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
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gers.12 About one car in three permitted African Americans to ride,
but the railway permitted whites to ride in all cars.93 In February of
1871, John W. Fields, a black barber visiting Baltimore from Virginia,
was ejected from a car that did not have such a sign. 4 He responded
by filing suit in United States circuit court, with Mr. Presstman as his
attorney.95 The case was tried before Judge Giles and Judge Hugh
Lennox Bond (appointed to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals by
President Ulysses Grant as a reward for his conduct during the Civil
War and on the bench in Baltimore). 96
Judge Bond charged the jury that if the company refused to trans-
port Fields solely because he was black, he should be awarded dam-
ages.97 That charge marked the end of segregation on horsecar
trolleys, because afterwards the trolley companies found it too expen-
sive to have separate cars for African Americans in the same numbers
and with the same convenience as cars restricted to whites.98 Thus,
Fields' victory integrated municipal transit in Baltimore.99
The next year Judge Giles heard another transportation case.' 00
On May 14, 1872, Ms. Josephine Carr, an African-American school
teacher from Kent County, boarded the steamer Chester in Baltimore,
intending to travel to Crumpton in Kent County.10 ' Upon boarding,
she took a seat in the main cabin.' 0 2 After the steamer left Baltimore,
she was asked to move, refused, and then was dragged to the forward
92. A Righteous Decision, BALT. AM. & COMMERCIAL ADVERTISER, Apr. 30, 1870, at 2.
93. The Rights of Colored Passengers on the Chesapeake Steamers, BALT. AM. & COMMERCIAL
ADVERTISER, June 19, 1872, at 2. Because African Americans could only ride in every third
car, they would have to wait nearly fifteen minutes for a car on some lines, and up to thirty
on others. Id.
94. The Right of Colored People to Ride in the City Passenger Cars-Damage Case, BALT. SUN,
Nov. 10, 1871, at 4.
95. Id.
96. Kermit L. Hall, Political Power and Constitutional Legitimacy: The South Carolina Ku
Klux Klan Trials, 1871-1872, 33 EMORY L.J. 921, 933-34 (1984).
97. The Street Car Case, BALT. Am. & COMMERCIAL ADVERTISER, Nov. 13, 1871, at 4. Rul-
ings instructing the jury were made jointly by Giles and Bond, although Bond delivered
them alone. Id. Fields came from Richmond, where protests and litigation over horsecar
railway discrimination were contentious. The Right of Colored People to Ride in the City Passen-
ger Cars-Damage Case, supra note 94, at 4; R.aINOWITZ, supra note 20, at 184.
98. See Jack Greenberg, Reflections on Leading Issues in Civil Rights, Then and Now, 57
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 625, 635 (1982) (recognizing "the idea of bringing a number of sepa-
rate-but-equal suits for the purpose of making segregation too expensive to maintain").
99. JEFFREY BRACKErr, NOTES ON THE PROGRESS OF THE COLORED PEOPLE OF MARYLAND
SINCE THE WAR 64 (1890).
100. The Rights of Colored Passengers on the Chesapeake Steamers, supra note 93, at 2 (noting a
case brought before Judge Giles by Josephine Carr).
101. Id.
102. Id.
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cabin by the captain, Edward Young, and one of the passengers, John
Nicholson."0 3 She refused to stay there and moved to the bow, where
she stood until the ship reached Chestertown. 10 4 Ms. Carr got off the
boat there, without having reached her destination farther up the
Chester River."°5 On May 31, with Stirling as her attorney, she filed a
libel against the ship in admiralty, reciting the assault.10 6
The captain admitted the facts, but argued that "the immemorial
usage and custom of confining the colored passengers to the forward
cabin and the forward deck" excused his actions. 0 7 Judge Giles
awarded Ms. Carr twenty-five dollars in compensatory damages.'0 8
Giles was reported to have noted the "great changes that have taken
place in the country," and to have relied upon the Passenger Railway
cases in ruling that common carriers cannot make distinctions as to
color in transporting passengers.10 9
III. THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF FEDERAL AND STATE
ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAW
In 1875 Congress adopted a Civil Rights Act that provided:
all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall
be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the accommo-
dations ... of ... public conveyances on land or water....
subject only to the conditions and limitations established by
law, and applicable alike to citizens of every race and
color.110
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. Admiraltyjurisdiction included suits on maritime contracts for carrying passen-
gers. The Moses Taylor, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 411, 427-28 (1867). Admiralty jurisdiction ap-
plied even when the vessel operated entirely intrastate. The Belfast, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 624,
641-42 (1869). Maritime liens were available in actions in rem under admiralty law as a
remedy for failure to give a passenger proper accommodations. Gleason v. The Willamette
Valley, 71 F. 712, 719-20 (N.D. Cal. 1896); see also GRANT GILMORE & CHARLEs L. BLACK, JR.,
THE LAw OF ADMIRALTY 35, 629 (2d ed. 1975) (stating that tortious conduct aboard a ship
can give rise to a maritime lien).
107. The Rights of Colored Passengers on the Chesapeake Steamers, supra note 93, at 2.
108. Id. The Captain was represented by Ferdinand Latrobe, subsequently the long time
mayor of Baltimore. Id.
109. C. Christopher Brown, The African-American Experience on Maryland's Eastern
Shore: 1860-1915 ch. 6, 16-17 (1996) (unpublished manuscript on file with the author).
110. Civil Rights Act, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335, 336 (1875).
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This enabled Maryland citizens to sue in federal courts to secure
equality in transportation, but its enactment was also an indication
that the Civil Rights Act of 1866 did not address the same problem."'
There is some support in legislative history for the proposition
that the 1875 Act was merely intended to prevent exclusion of blacks
along the lines of common carrier principles rather than to require
integration. 12 Many of the federal judges who interpreted the statute
found that the "full and equal enjoyment" required by the Act could
be satisfied by "separate but equal" treatment.11 Other courts held
the statute beyond congressional power.114 In Maryland, in Cully v.
Baltimore & Ohio Railroad,' 15 Harriet E. Cully was the lead plaintiff in a
case brought by eighteen Marylanders who sued the railroad for forc-
ing them to ride in separate and inferior accommodations.' 16 They
were represented by Archibald Stirling, Jr., who argued that the new
Civil Rights Act of 1875 entitled them to damages." 7
Judge Giles distinguished his earlier decisions in Thompson and
Fields on the grounds that those cases arose in diversity jurisdiction. 1 8
He did not mention The Chester, perhaps because he thought maritime
cases were not relevant to railway transport."' Giles cited the Slaugh-
ter-House Cases'2 ° for the proposition that rights to travel on a railroad
were a privilege of state citizenship, rather than a privilege of citizens
of the United States. 12 1 Consequently, he held, the Act of Congress
so far as it seeks to inflict penalties for the violation of any or
all rights which belong to citizens of a state, and not to citi-
zens of the United States as such, was the exercise of a power
111. See Civil Rights Act, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (1866). The Civil Rights Act of 1866 did not
specifically address the right to equal accommodations. Id.
112. Riegel, supra note 53, at 35-36.
113. Id. at 34 (citing Green v. City of Bridgeton, 10 F. Cas. 1090, 1093 (S.D. Ga. 1879));
Charge to the Grand Jury-Civil Rights Act, 30 F. Cas. 999, 1000-02 (C.C.W.D.N.C. 1875).
114. Charge to the GrandJury-Civil Rights Act, 30 F. Cas. at 1006; Smoot v. K. Cent. Ry. Co.,
13 F. 337, 343 (C.C.D. Ky. 1882).
115. 6 F. Cas. 946 (D. Md. 1876) (No. 3,466).
116. Id. at 946.
117. Id. at 946, 948.
118. Id. at 946-47.
119. Alternatively, Judge Giles may have forgotten the details-his descriptions in Cully
of Thompson and Fields get the citizenship of the parties wrong, probably because he was
writing without the benefit of printed versions of the previous decisions, and was too
pressed to look up the papers and slip opinions for the five-year old cases. Compare Balti-
more City Passenger Railway, Who Shall Ride in the Cars, Suit in the United States Court, supra note
40, at 1, and The Right of Colored People to Ride in the City Passenger Cars-Damage Case, supra
note 94, at 4, with Cully, 6 F. Cas. at 947.
120. 83 U.S. 36 (1872).
121. Cully, 6 F. Cas. at 947.
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not authorized by any provision of the constitution of the
United States.' 2
Supreme Court rulings discouraged any state laws prohibiting
segregation in transport (although Maryland was unlikely to enact a
public accommodations law in any event). 12' This time the Com-
merce Clause was the culprit. 124 In 1877, in Hall v. DeCuir, the Su-
preme Court struck down a Louisiana statute that prohibited all
common carriers within the state from making rules that discrimi-
nated on account of race or color. 25 The Court said:
No carrier of passengers can conduct his business with satis-
faction to himself, or comfort to those employing him, if on
one side of a State line his passengers, both white and
colored, must be permitted to occupy the same cabin, and
on the other be kept separate. Uniformity in the regulations
by which he is to be governed from one end to the other of
his route is a necessity in his business, and to secure it Con-
gress, which is untrammelled by State lines, has been in-
vested with the exclusive legislative power of determining
what such regulations shall be. 126
Congress, however, did not base its regulation of public convey-
ances on the Commerce Clause.'12  The Civil Rights Act of 1875 ap-
plied to intrastate as well as interstate commerce, and the Supreme
Court held it unconstitutional in the Civil Rights Cases128 in 1883, just
as Judge Giles had done in Maryland seven years earlier.' 29
122. Id. at 948. Because Giles decided that Congress lacked power to enact the Civil
Rights Act of 1875, he would have been very unlikely to find that the Civil Rights Act of
1866 applied to places of public accommodation, or that it would have been constitutional
if it did so.
123. E.g., Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U.S. 485, 490-91 (1877) (holding that states did not have
authority to prohibit racial discrimination in interstate transport).
124. Id. at 489.
125. Id. at 490-91.
126. Id. at 489-90.
127. KACZOROWSKJ, supra note 24, at 173 (noting that the Civil Rights Act of 1875 was
based on Congress' power under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
128. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
129. Cully v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 6 F. Cas. 946, 948 (D. Md. 1876) (No. 3,466). The
United States Supreme Court did not put the final nail in the coffin of the federal Civil
Rights Act of 1875 until 1913. See Butts v. Merchs. & Miners Transp. Co., 230 U.S. 126
(1913). Mrs. Mary F. Butts, an African-American woman from Everett, Massachusetts,
brought suit under the Act in United States district court in Massachusetts against the
Merchants and Miner's Transportation Corporation, a Maryland corporation that ran
ships between Boston and Norfolk, Virginia. Id. at 130. Although Mrs. Butts paid first class
fare, the company forced her to take second class accommodations. Id. She argued that
the Civil Rights Cases only invalidated the Civil Rights Act with respect to acts within the
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IV. SEPARATE BUT EQUAL COMMON CARRIER LAW
PRESERVING INTEGRATION
Cully and the Civil Rights Cases meant that any redress for unequal
treatment by common carriers must be sought in state courts con-
trolled by unsympathetic Democratic judges or in a federal suit where
admiralty jurisdiction or diversity of citizenship existed. On August
15, 1884, the Stewart sisters, Martha, Mary, Lucy, and Winnie, bought
first class tickets on the steamer Sue going from Baltimore to Kinsale,
Virginia in order to visit relatives in Westmoreland County.13 ° These
four women members of the Reverend Harvey Johnson's congrega-
tion were forced to move to clearly inferior accommodations on the
Sue. 3 The sleeping cabins in the stern were reserved for white pas-
sengers and had an attendant. 13 2 The forward cabins had no attend-
ant, dirty sheets, few pillows, no washing conveniences, and no key to
lock the doors.133 Even worse, the passageway to the cabin was ob-
structed by cattle.13 4 Because the forward cabins were so bad, they
stayed up all night in the saloon rather than going below decks to the
cabin.13 5 The steamer was owned by a Virginia company, and Rever-
end Johnson obtained the services of Stirling and attorney Alexander
Hobbs to bring a damage suit in admiralty in federal court on his
parishioners' behalf.
136
Counsel argued both that segregation was unlawful and that the
steamship company failed to provide equal accommodations.
137
Judge Morris declared that states could not affect the boat's regula-
tions because the vessel was in interstate commerce and that no fed-
eral statute applied. " He concluded that the owner's rights were
jurisdiction of the states. Id, at 132-33. She further argued that because Congress had
power to legislate with respect to boats on navigable waters under admiralty jurisdiction,
the Act should be held valid with respect to those areas where Congress had plenary juris-
diction-i.e., the high seas, the District of Columbia, and the territories of the United
States. Id. The Supreme Court unanimously ruled against her, holding that the Act was
not severable and was unconstitutional as a whole. Id. at 138.
130. DAVID C. HOLLY, TIDEWATER BY STEAMBOAT: A SAGA OF THE CHESAPEAKE: THE WEEMS
LINE ON THE PATUXENT, POTOMAC, AND RAPPAHANNOCK 173 (1991).
131. Elaine Freeman et al., A Study of Leadership in the Baltimore Negro Community
17-18 (1968) (unpublished M.A. thesis, George Washington University) (on file with the
George Washington University library).
132. The Sue, 22 F. 843, 847 (D. Md. 1885).
133. Id. at 846.
134. Id. at 846-47.
135. Holly, supra note 130, at 173.
136. Freeman, supra note 131, at 17-18 (citing Warner T. McGuinn, The Brotherhood of
Liberty) (unpublished manuscript).
137. The Sue, 22 F. at 844.
138. Id.
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governed by "common law."1 39 Morris concluded that segregation was
a reasonable regulation within the power of the company under fed-
eral common law, citing Hall v. DeCuir.14 ° Nevertheless, following the
street trolley decisions of his predecessor Judge Giles, Judge Morris
held that the ship had no right to provide inferior accommodations
on the basis of race to persons paying the same fare.' He awarded
the plaintiffs one hundred dollars in damages. 14 2
Reverend Johnson saw the need for lawyers who would fight for
the rights of African Americans, and he raised the money to hire
Hobbs to represent Charles Wilson in the lawsuit that opened the bar
for black lawyers in the state in 1885.' Although the court held that
the limitation to whites only was unconstitutional, Wilson did not gain
admission to the bar.'4 4 Reverend Johnson then went to Howard Uni-
versity where he recruited Everett J. Waring in October of 1885 to
come to Baltimore to commence practice. 14 5
One of Waring's cases revealed the limitations of Morris' opinion
in The Sue. Reverend Robert McGuinn, a black Baptist minister from
Annapolis, purchased a ticket on July 6, 1887, for travel from Balti-
more to Millenbeck, Virginia, on the steamer Mason L. Weems.14 6 At
supper, Reverend McGuinn sat at a table reserved for white passen-
gers.14 7 When they saw him there, the white passengers refused to eat
with him.'4 8 The captain, Thomas J. Cooper, asked him to move to
another table, but McGuinn refused to budge.'4 9 The captain then
moved the white passengers to another table.1 50 A passenger later as-
saulted McGuinn, and threats were made to throw the minister over-
board. 51 The captain told the passengers to leave McGuinn alone;
but, fearing for his safety, Reverend McGuinn left the vessel at Monas-
kon before it arrived at his destination.1 52 McGuinn hired Waring to
139. Id. (citing Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U.S. 485, 490 (1877)).
140. Id.
141. Id. at 846-48.
142. Id. at 848.
143. Admitted to the Bar, Decision in the Wilson Case, A Colored Man May Practice Law, BALT.
SUN, Mar. 20, 1885.
144. A. BRISCOE KOGER, THE NEGRO LAWYER IN MARYLAND 2-3 (1948).
145. Bogen, supra note 14, at 1041.
146. McGuinn v. Forbes, 37 F. 639, 639 (D. Md. 1889).
147. Id. at 640.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
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sue the captain and the owners of the ship, Georgeanna Williams and
Matilda S. Forbes, for damages based on mistreatment.
153
Judge Morris dismissed the complaint. 54 Citing The Sue, Judge
Morris said that when persons pay first class fare, the carrier must
make "a bona fide effort" to furnish the same accommodations re-
gardless of race. 155 Nevertheless, Judge Morris said, "[w]hen public
sentiment demands a separation of the passengers, it must be gratified
to some extent."156 Judge Morris explained that Reverend McGuinn
got the table he wished and the same food as others and the captain
was not responsible for the behavior of the other passengers. 157 Judge
Morris said there was some ground to suspect that the officers of the
boat did not protect the minister sufficiently from the threats of other
passengers, but there was not enough proof to find liability.'
58
Meanwhile, Congress had enacted the Interstate Commerce Act
in 1887 to deal with rate discrimination by railroads. 159 The Act in-
cluded a provision making it illegal for railroads to subject any person
"to any unreasonable or undue prejudice or disadvantage in any re-
spect whatsoever." 60 Although the clause was designed to deal with
discriminatory freight rates, the Interstate Commerce Commission
held that it applied to treatment of passengers as well. 6 ' Early deci-
sions of the Commission held that separation of the races was permis-
sible, but indicated that substantial inequality in treatment would
violate the Act.' 6 2 The effect of the statute on passengers was to ex-
tend the law of common carriers to the federal level for interstate
railroads. 1
63
153. Id. at 639-41.
154. Id. at 641.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. BARNES, supra note 1, at 6.
160. Id. (quoting the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 3(1) (1887) (repealed)).
161. Councill v. W. & Ad. R.R. Co., 1 I.C.C. 638, 641 (1887).
162. Id.; Heard v. Ga. R.R. Co., 1 I.C.C. 719, 722 (1888). The Commission ruled for the
plaintiff in Heard on the grounds that the car for blacks was unequal, but stated that
"[I]dentity ... in the sense that all must be admitted to the same car and that under no
circumstances segregation can be made, is not indispensable to give effect to the statute."
Id.; see also Heard v. Ga. R.R. Co., 2 I.C.C. 508 (1889); Edwards v. Nashville, C & St. Louis
Ry. Co., 12 I.C.C. 247 (1907).
163. Compare The Sue, 22 F. 843, 848 (D. Md. 1885) (requiring a common carrier to
make a bona fide effort to prevent actual discrimination in segregated accommodations),
with Councill, 1 I.C.C. at 641 (preventing a railroad from unduly discriminating while segre-
gating passengers under the Interstate Commerce Act).
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Thus federal law, both statutory and common law, left segrega-
tion within the discretion of the transportation companies as long as
the physical conditions of the segregated facilities were equal. 164 In
municipal railways, where blacks constituted only a small proportion
of the customers and single cars were involved, separate facilities were
not economical and the cars were integrated.1 65 Larger means of
transport were more capable of reserving space or cars for members
of one race and were more likely to operate a segregated system. 166 In
Maryland, the insistence on real equality in conditions by the federal
court and the costs of such treatment combined to produce substan-
tial integration in transport.
V. STATE-MANDATED SEGREGATION
Toward the end of the nineteenth century, the practice of segre-
gation in transportation was codified in a variety of municipal ordi-
nances. 16 7  When reconstruction ended, Mississippi, whose
reconstruction legislation prohibiting segregation had been invali-
dated as applied to interstate travel, replaced that law with one that
mandated segregation. a61 The Louisville, New Orleans and Texas
Railway Company was indicted for violating a Mississippi statute that
stated that "all railroads carrying passengers in this State ... shall pro-
vide equal, but separate, accommodation for the white and colored
races."' 6 9 The railway argued that the statute was unconstitutional on
the basis of Hall v. DeCuir,1 70 but the Mississippi Supreme Court lim-
ited the Mississippi statute to apply solely to commerce within the
state. 1 7 1 In Louisville, New Orleans & Texas Railway Co. v. Mississippi,1 72
the Supreme Court upheld the railroad's conviction.' 7 The Louisville
court carefully noted that it was deciding only whether a separate car
had to be provided, not whether the state could require anyone to
164. E.g., Heard, 1 I.C.C. at 722.
165. See id. at 721.
166. See, e.g., Klarman, supra note 35, at 396 (explaining that segregation was often the
result of railroad company policy rather than state coercion).
167. See BARNES, supra note 1, at 6-8 (discussing the proliferation of Jim Crow laws in
transportation during the last years of the nineteenth century).
168. Louisville, New Orleans & Tex. Ry. Co. v. Mississippi, 133 U.S. 587, 588 (1890).
169. Id. (quoting now-repealed Mississippi statute of 1888).
170. 95 U.S. 485 (1877).
171. Louisville, 133 U.S. at 591.
172. Id. at 587. Justices Harlan and Bradley dissented on the grounds that they believed
the Mississippi statute was a regulation of commerce forbidden under Hall v. DeCuir. Id. at
592-95 (Harlan & Bradley, J.J., dissenting).
173. Id. at 592.
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ride in that car. 174 Because the only injury was to the railroad in hav-
ing to put an extra car on, the sole question addressed by the Court
was whether that burden violated the dormant commerce clause:
No question arises under this section, as to the power of the
State to separate in different compartments interstate pas-
sengers, or to affect in any manner, the privileges and rights
of such passengers. All that we can consider is, whether the
State has the power to require that railroad trains within her
limits shall have separate accommodations for the two races.
That affecting only commerce within the State is no invasion
of the powers given to Congress by the commerce clause.
175
With the Louisville decision removing the impact of Hall and the
negative implications of the commerce clause on state regulations of
transportation, more states passed laws requiring segregation, includ-
ing the Louisiana law challenged in Plessy v. Ferguson.
176 The peti-
tioner in Plessy claimed that the segregation law violated the
Fourteenth Amendment. 177 When the case reached the Supreme
Court, there was little precedent for state laws on segregation.
178 In-
stead, there was precedent under common carrier law for the proposi-
tion that passengers were entitled to equal treatment from private
transport companies, but that separation of the races was consistent
with equality.1
79
The Supreme Court upheld the Louisiana law, citing eleven cases
for the proposition that "[s]imilar statutes for the separation of the
two races... were held to be constitutional."'8 ° In fact, not a single
cited case involved such a statute. 18' All but one of the cases, which
included The Sue and McGuinn v. Forbes, was a challenge to the dis-
criminatory policy of the carrier in which the courts had simply found
174. Id. at 589.
175. Id. at 591.
176. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
177. Id. at 542.
178. A number of cases upheld school segregation against Fourteenth Amendment chal-
lenges, but the provision of services by the state could be distinguished from regulation of
private businesses. Regulatory laws were "protection of the laws" in a way that provision of
services may not have been. Further, the provision of benefits raises the issue of the state
as a market participant rather than regulator. We would not make such distinctions for
equal protection purposes today, but it was not so clear in 1896 that segregation in state-
provided benefits necessarily fell under the same rules of equality as state laws requiring
private persons to segregate.
179. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 548.
180. Id.
181. See, e.g., Day v. Owen, 5 Mich. 520, 520-22 (1858) (listing charges against a common
carrier with no mention of a statute analogous to the Plessy statute).
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that segregation was permissible under the common law of carriers or
the statutory law of the Interstate Commerce Act.18 2 Counsel had
cited them for the proposition that segregation was a reasonable regu-lation by the carrier, not for holding that it was a reasonable regula-
tion of the state. 8 3 Counsel argued that what was reasonable for the
carrier should not be a violation of equal protection when required by
the state, but the Supreme Court conflated the argument and asserted
falsely that the cases held the statutes constitutional.' 84
The only statute in any of these cases which required a carrier to
act on the basis of color was the statute in People v. King.'8 5 In citing
this case, the Supreme Court got things exactly backward.' 86 That
statute prohibited racial discrimination: "no citizen of this state can, by
reason of race, color or previous condition of servitude, be excluded
from the equal enjoyment of any accommodation, facility or privilege
furnished by inn-keepers or common carriers, or by owners, manag-
ers, or lessees of theaters or other places of amusement."' 8 7 The NewYork Court of Appeals said the law was identical in import to the CivilRights Act of 1875.188 Further, the Court said it was similar to the
Mississippi "Civil Rights Act" of 1873, and the Louisiana Constitution
and laws of 1870 and 1871.189 The Court then upheld the conviction
of a roller rink proprietor for refusing to sell a ticket to a colored
person in violation of the law, finding that the law was
constitutional. 9 0
The United States Supreme Court had become so used to theproposition that segregation was appropriate in transportation that itdid not even consider closely the difference between requiring segre-gation and prohibiting discrimination, between the carrier's right to
182. See McGuinn v. Forbes, 37 F. 639 (D. Md. 1889); Houck v. S. Pac. Ry., 38 F. 226(W.D. Tex. 1888); Logwood v. Memphis & Co. R.R., 23 F. 318 (W.D. Tenn. 1885); The Sue,22 F. 843 (D. Md. 1885); People v. King, 18 N.E. 245 (N.Y. 1888); Chesapeake & Ohio R.R.v. Wells, 4 S.W. 5 (Tenn. 1887); Memphis & Co. R.R. v. Benson, 4 S.W. 5 (Tenn. 1887);Chi. & N.W. Ry. v. Williams, 55 Ill. 185 (1870); West Chester & Phila. R.R. Co. v. Miles, 55Pa. 209 (1867); Day v. Owen, 5 Mich. 520 (1858); Heard v. Ga. R.R. Co., 3 I.C.C. 111
(1889).
183. See Plessy, 163 U.S. at 548-49; see also Day, 5 Mich. at 525-26 (finding the segregation
by the common carrier, not the state, to be reasonable).
184. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 548.
185. 18 N.E. 245 (N.Y. 1888).
186. See Plessy, 163 U.S. at 548 (citing King for the proposition that states have held
constitutional statutes mandating segregation of the races).
187. King, 18 N.E. at 245.
188. Id. at 246.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 249.
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segregate and the state's right to require the carrier to segregate.
19
'
In confusing the command of the Constitution with common law
rules, it rendered a disastrous decision that would take more than half
a century to reverse.
1 92
After Plessy, segregation laws flourished.1 93 In Maryland, Demo-
cratic legislators introduced a bill in 1902 to require segregation in
transport.1 94 The African-American community organized to defeat
it.' 9 5 Attorney Warner T. McGuinn chaired the "General Committee
on the Separate Car Law."' 96 He led a delegation to the legislature,
which included attorneys Ashbie Hawkins, Harry Cummings, Dr. Wil-
liam Bishop, and C.H. King of Annapolis. 19v McGuinn addressed the
Committee on Corporations and presented a petition signed by more
than one thousand colored and white citizens of Baltimore opposing
the bill.19 The railroads and steamship companies joined the protest,
preferring to operate their business in the most economically efficient
manner.199 The coalition defeated the bill in 1902.200 Nevertheless,
the combined opposition of the black community and the transporta-
tion companies was overwhelmed two years later.2 °t
Riding the crest of a wave of racial prejudice, the Maryland legis-
lature in 1904 enacted a law that required segregated cars on steam-
powered railroads and separate quarters on ships.20 2 The law did not
apply to local transportation, where the trolleys had moved from
horsepower to electric power in the 1890s. 2 3 The new law required
segregation on all steam-operated railroads with limited exceptions
191. See Plessy, 163 U.S. at 548-49 (discussing only the state's right to segregate after
citing numerous decisions dealing with the right of common carriers to segregate).
192. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494-95 (1954) (overruling Plessy fifty-eight
years later).
193. See BARNES, supra note 1, at 10 (noting that many states passed railroad segregation
statutes in the wake of Plessy).
194. Big Test Against Jim Crow Cars, AFRO-AM. LEDGER (Balt.), Feb. 22, 1902, at 4.
195. Id.
196. Notices, AFRO-AM. LEDGER (Balt.), Feb. 15, 1902, at 5.
197. Big Test Against fim Crow Cars, supra note 194, at 4.
198. Id.
199. Warner McGuinn, speaking for the delegation noted "Railroad and steamboat
companies have alike joined in the protest." Id. at 4. Two years later, an ad in the Afro-
American Ledger for the Baltimore & Annapolis Short Line R.R. Co. began with "This Com-
pany did what it could to prevent the passage of what is called the Jim Crow Law." Round
Bay, AFRO-AM. LEDGER (Bait.), Apr. 16, 1904, at 5.
200. See Big Test Against Jim Crow Cars, supra note 194, at 4 (noting opposition to Jim
Crow laws). Maryland's Jim Crow transportation laws were enacted two years later. See
1904 Md. Laws 186-87, ch. 109, § 1-7; ch. 110, § 1-3.
201. James Crow, AFRo-AM. LEDGER (Balt.), July 16, 1904, at 1.
202. 1904 Md. Laws 186-87, ch. 109, § 1-7; ch. 110, § 1-3.
203. See OLSON, supra note 39, at 210-11.
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for express trains that did not stop in the state, parlor or sleeping cars(where the number of black passengers might be too small to main-
tain a separate car without great financial injury to the railroad), and
for nurses and officers in charge of prisoners.20 4 As an article in the
Afro said:
So afraid were they that they could not be kept away from
the colored people, that they passed a law to separate the
colored and white on steam boats and on steam cars. They
would likely have passed such a law for the street cars, but we
understand that the trolley managers held up both hands,
and after having their pockets rifled to the tune of numerous
thousands of Uncle Sam's promises to pay, were allowed to
go on their way, sadder but wiser as to the ways of an average
Democratic legislatureman.
However, the steamboat men and the steam railroad men,
refused to stand and deliver, and so they passed what they
were pleased to call a "Separate Car Law" to keep the whites
and blacks apart in the daytime and in places where men
mostly congregate. 20 5
To fight the railroad segregation law, the black community, led
by the Maryland Suffrage League and the Afro-American Ledger, organ-
ized a boycott of the railroads.206 The railroads had made a practice
of giving a rebate to churches who chartered railroad cars for annual
meetings.20 7 This rebate was a significant base for the support of the
church, and the boycott deprived the churches of this much needed
revenue. 20 8 After eight months, the demand for revenues overcame
the principle of resistance to the law, and the boycott collapsed. 20 9
Professor William H.H. Hart of Howard Law School decided to
test the law.210 He was arrested for refusing to occupy the car assigned
204. 1904 Md. Laws 187, ch. 109, § 7.
205. James Crow Enters Maryland and Creates Disturbances and Incidents and Gets Into Court,
AFRo-AM. LEDGER (Balt.), July 16, 1904, at 4.
206. See id.
They are refusing to ride on the railroads and steam boats, except where they
must do so. The few calloused individuals, who have so far forgotten themselves
as to arranged excursions, have found to their cost that the people have decided
that the excursion season is about over with them for the present at least. They
positively decline to go on them.
Id.; see also Railroads Losing Patronage, AFRo-AM. LEDGER (Balt.), Aug. 27, 1904, at 1 (noting
that the "Separate Car Law" was causing the railroads to lose black patrons).
207. William George Paul, The Shadow of Equality: The Negro & Baltimore, 1864-1911,
at 287-88 (1972) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin).
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Hart v. State, 100 Md. 595, 60 A. 457 (1905); KOGER, supra note 14, at 9.
744 [VOL. 63:721
2004] PRECURSORS OF ROSA PARKS: TRANSPORTATION CASES 745
to colored passengers. 21 Hart and an unidentified African-American
lawyer from Maryland did the preparation for the case,
1 although it
was presented by a white attorney, Henry McCulloch.
213 The main
ground of contention was the effect to be given Hall v. DeCuir.
214 Mc-
Culloch argued that any state regulation of interstate passengers
which required either segregation or integration would be an imper-
missible burden on interstate commerce.215 The Attorney General for
the State responded that Hall applied only to requiring integration,
and that segregation was within the legitimate police powers of the
state.2 16 The Court of Appeals held that the statute was unconstitu-
tional as applied to passengers like Hart who were traveling inter-
state.2 1 7 Referring to trips between Virginia and Pennsylvania, the
court pointed out that over a short trip, passengers would have to be
separated for six miles, then allowed to mingle in West Virginia, sepa-
rated again in Maryland, and again allowed to mingle in Penn-
sylvania. 218 Thus, there would be at least three changes in that short
distance.219 The Court concluded that this was too much of a burden
on interstate commerce to be sustained under the police powers of
the states, and it reversed the judgment against Hart.
220
But dicta in the opinion, citing Plessy v. Ferguson, stated that the
law could be constitutionally applied to intrastate passengers: "[W] e
see no difficulty in sustaining the law in so far as it applies to intra-
state passengers. '221 The Court said that the statute was valid as it
affected commerce wholly within the state, but was invalid as to inter-
state passengers "and must be construed as not applying to them.
2 2 2
The Court even suggested to the railroads that segregation might be a
good idea:
If it be necessary for the comfort and safety of the passen-
gers, and especially for the preservation of order, in portions
of the State where the two races are anything like equally
211. Hart, 100 Md. at 600, 60 A. at 457.
212. KOGER, supra note 14, at 9.
213. Hart, 100 Md. at 596, 60 A. at 457; see KOGER, supra note 14, at 9 (stating that the
records do not show any negro as an attorney of record).
214. Hart, 100 Md. at 608, 60 A. at 460.
215. Id. at 596, 60 A. at 457.
216. Id. at 599, 60 A. at 457; see id at 599 (summarizing the attorney general's
argument).
217. Id. at 613, 60 A. at 462-63.
218. Id., 60 A. at 463.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 613-14, 60 A. at 463.
221. Id. at 614, 60 A. at 460.
222. Id. at 615, 60 A. at 460.
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divided in numbers, or the feeling between the races is such
as to make it desirable to keep them separated, the carriers
themselves have full authority to do so as we have seen above.
They could undoubtedly adopt such regulations, even on in-
ter-state trains, as would relieve them and their passengers
from all danger and inconvenience on account of the two
races travelling together, by having separate cars or compart-
ments on trains doing local business. 22 3
Thus, despite Hart's victory, the railroads continued to operate segre-
gated trains.224
In 1908, the segregation laws were extended to require separate
toilets and separate sleeping cabins on steamships. 225 A new statute
was adopted to apply to electric railways operating more than twenty
miles beyond an incorporated town (the twenty mile rule exempted
municipal transit in Baltimore from the requirement). 226 Because
many such railways had only one car, the statute provided for designa-
tion of separate seats.2 2 7 A seat for two passengers was defined as a
separate seat:228
When the seats in any car, coach or compartment shall all be
occupied, but not filled, and the increased number of pas-
sengers can not be accommodated with separate seats, the
conductor . . . is hereby authorized to assign passengers of
the same color to the vacant seats, and he can, with the per-
mission and consent of the occupant, assign a passenger of
the other color to the unoccupied seats, but not
otherwise. 29
All the segregation statutes also contained express prohibitions
against "discrimination. 23 0
The federal courts were no longer a good venue to challenge seg-
regation-the United States Supreme Court had upheld segregation
statutes in Plessy and Louisville and the state statute21 displaced the
common law principles that the federal courts had used sympatheti-
223. Id.
224. See infra notes 246-275 and accompanying text (discussing challenges to the contin-
ued practice of segregating train passengers).
225. 1908 Md. Laws 85, ch. 617.
226. 1908 Md. Laws 88, ch. 248, § 1.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id. ch. 248, § 5.
230. See, e.g., 1904 Md. Laws 186, ch. 109.
231. 1908 Md. Laws 85, ch. 617 (requiring steamboat companies to "provide separate
toilet, or retiring rooms, and separate sleeping quarters for white and colored
passengers").
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cally in the nineteenth century. 23 2 Although the federal Interstate
Commerce Commission heard complaints about discrimination in in-
terstate travel, it did not award damages and was unsympathetic to the
claims.2 3 For example, African Methodist Episcopal ministers com-
plaining about second class treatment in trains were unsuccessful in
two cases before the Interstate Commerce Commission in 1909 de-
spite showing mistreatment or different treatment.
23 4
In 1910, Maryland established the Public Service Commission and
granted it power over common carriers. 235 Like the federal Interstate
Commerce Commission, the primary concern of the Maryland Public
Service Commission was rate regulation, but it also had power to hear
complaints about service. 236 Shortly after its establishment, W. Ashbie
Hawkins represented several plaintiffs before the Public Service Com-
mission protesting against the segregated conditions both in boats
and trains under the Jim Crow law.
23 v
Hawkins filed a complaint with the Public Service Commission in
December of 1911, against the Baltimore, Chesapeake and Atlantic
Railway for discrimination on their steamboats the Avalon and the
Joppa.238 He stated that staterooms for colored passengers on boats
were all inside cabins that were more cramped and poorly ventilated
than accommodations for whites, and that colored people only got
what remained of the food because they were only allowed to eat after
232. See supra notes 86-109 and accompanying text (discussing cases in which federal
courts required equal treatment of all passengers).
233. E.g., Gaines v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 16 I.C.C. 471, 476 (1909) (holding that un-
due discrimination was not proven when complainants alleged unequal treatment in meals
and sleeping accommodations on account of their race); Cozart v. S. Ry. Co., 16 I.C.C. 226,
231 (1909) (finding no unjust discrimination when black train patrons were denied seats
in first class).
234. Gaines, 16 I.C.C. at 474-76 (finding it a reasonable practice to serve negro dinner
patrons last because there were fewer interstate travelers of color). The Commission also
found that the reluctance of agents to sell tickets for sleeping cars to African-American
patrons was not severe enough to lead to an order because agents would eventually sell
such tickets. Id.; see also Cozart, 16 I.C.C. at 231 (holding that denial of first-class seats did
not amount to a pattern or practice of discrimination).
235. JOHN PHILIP HILL & ARTHUR R. PADGETr, ANNOTATED PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
LAW OF MARYLAND 3 (1913).
236. HENRY G. BURKE, THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF MARYLAND 124, 131-57
(1932). In a study of the Public Service Commission of Maryland, the author devoted a
chapter to valuation and rate cases, id. at 131-57, but mentioned racial complaints only
once, when listing the complaints in cases to vacate orders of the Commission. Id. at 124-
25.
237. Officers Admit Color Discrimination, AFRo-AM. LEDGER (Balt.), Dec. 9, 1911, at 1; Attor-
ney Hawkins Makes Appeal, AFRo-AM. LEDGER (Balt.), Feb. 17, 1912, at 8.
238. Complaints to Public Service Commission: Lawyer Hawkins Objects to Discrimination on the
Boats of the B.C. & A. Railway, AfRo-AM. LEDGER (Balt.), Dec. 2, 1911, at 4.
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whites.23 '9  Hawkins also complained that ministers of the African
Methodist Episcopal church and their wives who had taken a steam-
boat to Cambridge for a meeting were forced to sit in a salon all night
because there were not enough staterooms available to them. 2 40 The
Commission dismissed the complaint.2 4 The Commissioners said
that the arrangement of the boat meant that all cabins could not be
outside cabins, and that some first-class cabins were inside cabins.2 4 2
Because some first-class cabins occupied by whites were inside cabins,
it was not a denial of first-class treatment to restrict colored passengers
to the inside cabins, although the Commission admitted that the as-
signment was the worst that could be made. 24 3 The number of state-
rooms set aside was reasonable because it was more than adequate
most of the time, and thus there was no violation of the law.244 Haw-
kins appealed the decision to the Court of Common Pleas, without
success.
2 4 5
Later that year, Thomas Turner, a Baltimore school teacher, com-
plained about the dirty conditions for African Americans on the rail-
road in a letter to the Public Service Commission.2 4 6 He also
complained that the only compartments in which African Americans
could ride were a vestibule to or a partition in the smoking area for
white men.2 47 Hawkins represented Turner before the Commis-
sion.2 48 The Public Service Commission dismissed the complaint
about dirty conditions on the grounds that improvements had been
made so an order was not necessary.24 9 However, the Commission or-
dered the Baltimore, Chesapeake and Atlantic Railroad to provide
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Hawkins v. Baltimore, Chesapeake & Ad. Ry. Co., 3 Md. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 49, 52
(1912).
242. Id. at 51.
243. See id. (noting that "while the rooms assigned to colored passengers are first class
according to the layout of the steamers and thus a technical compliance with the law is
obtained, yet the assignment is confined to the inferior of the two first-class rooms.., on
account of the surroundings . . ." which included an adjoining smoking room, the men's
toilet, and loud swinging doors).
244. Id.
245. Attorney Hawkins Makes Appeal, supra note 237, at 8.
246. Shocking Conditions on B.C. & A. Railroad, AFRO-AM. LEDGER (Balt.), Dec. 14, 1912, at1.
247. Id.; B.C. & A. Railway Before Public Service Board, AFRo-AM. LEDGER (Balt.), Feb. 1,
1913, at 1.
248. Id.
249. Turner v. Balt., Chesapeake & Ad. Ry. Co., 4 Md. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 101, 102
(1913).
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seating (with partitions) in nonsmoking as well as smoking cars to as-
sure greater equality in the future.25 °
In 1914, Ashbie Hawkins represented James Jenkins,251 who was
prosecuted for refusing to occupy a seat designated for colored pas-
sengers on the Washington, Baltimore & Annapolis Electric Rail-
road.252 The defendant demurred to the indictment for the failure to
allege that he was an intrastate passenger.25 5 The trial court sustained
the demurrer, but the state appealed to the Court of Appeals.254 Here
Hawkins was joined on the brief by George McMechen.255 They ar-
gued that the court should take judicial notice that the railway com-
pany was engaged in interstate commerce between Baltimore and
Washington, D.C.256 They argued further that the 1908 statute should
be invalid as a whole because its language did not distinguish between
interstate and intrastate passengers. 257 The Court of Appeals upheld
the 1908 statute, construing it to apply only to intrastate passengers. 58
It then found that interstate travel was an affirmative defense that
must be raised by the defendant.
259
When the Democratic legislature attempted to pass another stat-
ute that would extend the Jim Crow provisions to Baltimore municipal
transit, the African-American community organized again to defeat
the bill.260 W. Ashbie Hawkins was one of the leaders this time.261 But
the laws of 1908 and the decision of the court in Jenkins had already
brought segregation to transportation throughout Maryland.262 Al-
250. Id. at 103.
251. State v. Jenkins, 124 Md. 376, 377, 92 A. 773, 773 (1914). Hawkins acted as counsel
for the fledgling NAACP. Garrett Power, Apartheid Baltimore Style: The Residential Segregation
Ordinances of 1910-1913, 42 MD. L. Rjv. 289, 311 (1983); NAACP BALTIMORE CITY BRANcH,
BALTIMORE BRANCH HIsToRY, at http://www.naacpbaltimore.org/history.html (last visited
Mar. 5, 2004). Warner T. McGuinn also served the Baltimore NAACP branch. Lucia A.
Silecchia, Things Are Seldom What They Seem:Judges and Lawyers in the Tales of Mark Twain, 35
CONN. L. REv. 559, 563 n.15 (2003).
252. Jenkins, 124 Md. at 378, 92 A. at 773.
253. Id. at 378-81, 92 A. at 773-74.
254. Id. at 378, 92 A. at 773.
255. Id. at 377, 92 A. at 773.
256. Id. at 380-81, 92 A. at 774.
257. Id. at 383, 92 A. at 775.
258. Id. at 381, 92 A. at 774.
259. Id. at 384, 92 A. at 775. The court remanded the case so thatJenkins could be tried
on the indictment. Id.
260. Will Oppose 'Jim Crow" Cars: Colored Citizens Up in Arms Against Proposed Separate Car
Law Introduced in Legislate, AwRo-AM. LEDGER (Balt.), Apr. 4, 1914, at 1 (reporting a
threatened boycott of the street cars should the bill become law).
261. Id.
262. See 1904 Md. Laws 186-89, chs. 109, 110 (requiring racially segregated railroad cars
and quarters on steamships); Jenkins, 124 Md. at 81, 92 A. at 774.
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though the state could not require the segregation of interstate pas-
sengers,263 it might enforce the decisions of the railroad with respect
to such passengers. 264 But the railroad was likely to segregate inter-
state passengers to correspond with the treatment they were required
to give intrastate passengers.265
The indifference of the Maryland Public Service Commission and
the federal courts to the plight of African Americans on segregated
transport did not end resistance. For example, in 1919, Warner T.
McGuinn represented the publisher of the Afro-American Ledger, CarlJ.
Murphy, and Louis Davenport in suits against a railway company in
their respective local courts for $5000 each because of the conditions
on the electric line between Baltimore and Washington.266 These
cases, however, had to focus on provisions of the statutes requiring
equal treatment rather than defeating segregation. 267
In succeeding years, African Americans continued to battle for
their rights on public transport, but the set of decisions culminating
in Jenkins diverted the fight for decades into controversy over the con-
ditions of the segregated cars rather than seeking integration di-
rectly.268 It would be another four decades until another Marylander,
Elmer Henderson, would succeed in getting the United States Su-
preme Court to hold that segregative dining practices on the railroads
could not be equal.269  His victory in integrating interstate travel
marginalized the state's attempt to segregate transportation within the
state and contributed to the repeal of Maryland's transportation segre-
263. Jenkins, 124 Md. at 381, 92 A. at 774.
264. Hart v. State, 100 Md. 595, 614-15, 60 A. 457, 463 (1905).
265. See id. at 615, 60 A. at 463 (suggesting that carriers should segregate passengers on
interstate trains to "relieve" the carrier from the "danger and inconvenience on account of
the two races travelling together").
266. Two Baltimoreans File Suit Against W.B. & A. Railroad, AFRO-KM. LEDGER (Balt.), Feb.
14, 1919, at 2.
For more than a year, the electric line has been forcing interstate passengers to
ride in separate coaches in violation of the law and arresting and maltreating
others who insisted that the provisions of the law be carried out.
The case of Mrs. Coleman of Washington, who received $20 damages in the Supe-
rior Court of this city last summer is regarded as only the beginning, and the
outcome of the two cases now on the docket will determine whether the company
is to continue its policy of illegal jim crow, or whether it is to act within the law.
Id.
267. BARNES, supra note 1, at 16; see also Two Baltimoreans File Suit Against WB. & A.
Railroad, supra note 266, at 2 (characterizing the conditions on the train as "notorious").
268. See BARNES, supra note 1, at 16 (stating that for thirty years, southern blacks sought
only to equalize transit accommodations rather than to undo segregation).
269. Henderson v. United States, 339 U.S. 816, 825-26 (1950). The Court held that the
railway's dining regulations violated the Interstate Commerce Act and so did not reach the
constitutional issues. Id.
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gation laws in 1951.270 Even more crucially, forty years after the Jen-
kins case, Thurgood Marshall, who grew up in Baltimore hearing
about both Warner T. McGuinn and W. Ashbie Hawkins,2 7 ' success-
fully litigated in Brown v. Board of Education,272 where the Court held
that segregation by the state was inherently unequal. 27 Following
Brown, laws requiring racial segregation of passengers on buses in
Montgomery, Alabama were struck down in the Browder decision, a
case brought by participants in the Montgomery bus boycott.2 74 Thus,
the generations of protesters and lawyers who resisted segregation in
transportation in Maryland played their role in making it possible for
a woman in Montgomery, Alabama to change the world.275
270. 1951 Md. Laws, ch. 22; see BARNES, supra note 1, at 82.
271. See WILLIAMS, supra note 16, at 15-60 (discussing Marshall's childhood and
education).
272. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
273. See id. at 495 (concluding that "[s]eparate educational facilities are inherently
unequal").
274. Browder v. Gayle, 142 F. Supp. 707, 717 (M.D. Ala. 1956) (holding that "there is
now no rational basis upon which the separate but equal doctrine can be validly applied to
public carrier transportation").
275. BARNES, supra note 1, at 108-15 (discussing Rosa Parks' refusal to vacate her seat for
a white passenger, her subsequent arrest, and the bus boycott movement in Montgomery).
